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INTRODUCTION

“The two enemies of the people are criminals and government, so let us tie
the second down with the chains of the Constitution so the second will not
become the legalized version of the first.”1
Thomas Jefferson, Third President of the United States
On one brisk autumn evening after many hours spent accompanied by
highlighters, pens, and excruciatingly dry textbook passages, a young man
decided to take a break from his academic pursuits and join his brother on a
brief trip to the neighborhood McDonald’s restaurant. The two brothers
were pulled over by a local police officer as they arrived at their destination
on the suspicion of driving under the influence. Uneasy about encounters
with police, given the extensive documentation of police misconduct
around the country,2 the brothers attempted to document their encounter
with the officers via their cell phone video cameras. Before long, they both
found themselves handcuffed in the back of the squad car faced with possible felony convictions and jail time for violating the Illinois Eavesdropping
Act (“Act”).3
Unfortunately, this is not an Orwellian fable told to foment unnerving
chills; this actually happened to Fanon and Adrian Perteet of DeKalb, Illinois in November of 2009.4 Despite its lack of notoriety, the Illinois Eaves1.
Quotations,
THOMAS
JEFFERSON
MONTICELLO,
http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/two-enemies-people-are-criminals-andgovernmentquotation (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
2.
See Matthew Hickman, Citizen Complaints About Police Use of Force, BUREAU
OF JUS. STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=553 (last updated
Apr. 16, 2010) (referencing statistics from a 2002 national report on large state and local
police departments, which revealed 26,556 total citizen complaints about excessive police
force, just over two-thousand cases of which were sustained); see also Craig B. Futterman et
al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police Department’s Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 251,
265 (2008). This statistical study of Chicago police misconduct from 2002 to 2004 reported
that a total of 10,149 complaints were filed on the grounds of brutality, illegal searches,
sexual harassment/abuse/rape, racial abuse, and finally, planting evidence and false arrest.
Id. at 267; 2010 Annual Report, Injustice Everywhere: The National Police Misconduct
Statistics
and
Reporting
Project,
Figure
10,
INJUSTICE
EVERYWHERE,
http://www.injusticeeverywhere.com/?page_id=4135 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (indicating
how, in a national statistical analysis, police officers commit more assaults, sexual assaults
and murders, per capita, than the rest of society combined).
3.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14 (2008).
4.
Becky Schlikerman & Kristen Mack, Editorial, Suit Hits Ban on Recording the
Police ACLU Challenges State’s Eavesdropping Law, which Makes Violation a Felony, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 20, 2010, at C1.
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dropping Act has been used several times throughout recent years to prosecute individuals across the State for audio recording on-duty police officers
and other public officials.5 At its most basic level, this is not how a truly
free society is supposed to operate.
The Act, as currently constructed, impedes upon citizens’ constitutional First Amendment6 rights, implicates Fourth Amendment privacy7 and
Fourteenth Amendment due process issues,8 and finally, conflicts with
compelling public policy concerns that indicate reform is necessary.9 Given
the constitutional and public policy arguments favoring modification, along
with the breadth of ongoing police abuses of citizens, not only in Illinois,
5.
For a compilation of cases, see Amended Complaint at ¶ 40, ACLU v. Alvarez,
No. 10-CV-05235 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/Amended-Complaint-proposed-11-18-10.pdf [hereinafter ACLU
Amended Complaint]. Since the fall of 2010, when this Note was initially drafted, the media
attention granted to the now infamous Illinois Eavesdropping Act has been anything but
lacking. See e.g., infra note 65. In fact, the Illinois Eavesdropping Act and its moratorium on
audio recording of public officials, namely police officers, in public ways has been a hot
topic of discussion for national news pundits across the cable news network spectrum. See
e.g., Judge Napolitano on Illinois Judge Ruling Eavesdropping Law Unconstitutional, FOX
NEWS INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2012, 4:47 PM), http://foxnewsinsider.com/2012/03/12/judgenapolitano-on-illinois-judge-ruling-eavesdropping-law-as-unconstitutional/. Beyond its
expanding notoriety, there have been a few recent noteworthy developments on this issue
since the dawning of the 2012 new year. In one such development, on March 2nd, Cook
County Judge Stanley Sacks held in a 12-page opinion that the Illinois Eavesdropping Act’s
current construction, with respect to audio recording on-duty law enforcement officers in
public ways, is unconstitutional due to its overbroad application and potentiality for criminalizing “’wholly innocent conduct.’” Jason Meisner, Eavesdropping Law Unconstitutional,
Court Says: Victory for Activists who Want to Record Police Officers, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 3,
2012), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-eavesdropping-law-ruling-030320120303,0,3808980.story. The decision comes on the eve of preparations for the G-8 financial summit which was to be held in the city of Chicago at the end of May, until less than a
week after the March 2nd opinion was rendered, the Obama Administration revealed it
would move the gathering to Camp David Maryland in the hopes to ensure a “‘more intimate
setting.’” Rick Pearson, Obama Explains Decision to Move G-8 Summit from Chicago, LA
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/06/news/la-pn-obama-chicagog8-summit-20120306. Coincidence? Or as some have speculated in the wake of Judge
Sacks’ opinion, tactical political chess move in the efforts to avoid thousands of expected
grass-roots financial protesters and the negative publicity that often coincides with such
demonstrations as a consequence of police brutality and threats captured via cell-phone
video/audio equipment? See id. In other related news, in a 59 to 45 vote, the Illinois House
of Representatives recently voted down proposed legislation that would have decriminalized audio recording law enforcement officers in public ways. Illinois Eavesdropping Amendment Bill Killed in Illinois House, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 23, 2012 9:56 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/illinois-eavesdropping-am_n_1373688.html.
6.
See infra Part III.A.2.
7.
See infra Part III.B.1.
8.
See infra Part III.A.1.
9.
See infra Part III.B.2.
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but also around the entire nation,10 the Act as it applies to on-duty police
officers should be altered so as to not include a reasonable and/or subjective
expectation of privacy for on-duty police officers when “(a) the officers are
performing their public duties, (b) the officers are in public places, (c) the
officers are speaking at a volume audible to the unassisted human ear, and
(d) the manner of recording is otherwise lawful.”11
In Part II, this Comment discusses the history and background of the
Act by taking a look at the current law and its legislative and precedential
history, including Illinois specific cases challenging or dealing with the Act.
Next, this Comment briefly analyzes a few other jurisdictional eavesdropping laws in order to help clarify and distinguish the current Illinois Act.
Finally, Part III analyzes the rationale, both constitutional and otherwise, of
why the Act needs to be altered as soon as possible.
This Comment argues that because of certain exemptions allowing police officers to record citizens without their consent, the Act creates open
viewpoint speaker discrimination. Accordingly, since the Act would be
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis under a constitutional challenge for this
type of discrimination, it would be struck down. On the other hand, if strict
scrutiny is deemed inappropriate, intermediate scrutiny would be appropriate, and under this standard of review, the Act would be struck down as
well.12 Part III also discusses the unreasonableness of holding valid expectations of privacy when police officers and other public officials are in public ways speaking to citizens. Lastly, this Comment analyzes compelling
public policy reasons for why criminalizing audio recording of public police conversations with citizens is vehemently against the best interests of
the people.13
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE ILLINOIS EAVESDROPPING ACT AS IT IS CURRENTLY CONSTRUCTED

The Illinois Eavesdropping Act is a criminal statute that makes it illegal to use any type of recording device to document any conversation, even
10.
See Hickman, supra note 2; see also, e.g., Futterman, supra note 2.
11.
Complaint at 1, ACLU v. Alvarez, No. 10-CV-05235 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2010),
available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/COMPLAINT-in-ACLUv.-Alvarez-FILED-8-19-10.pdf [hereinafter ACLU Complaint]. This was the central thesis
utilized by the ACLU in its federal suit against Cook County State’s Attorney, Anita Alvarez, which challenged the Act as an unconstitutional barrier against the protected First
Amendment right to gather, receive, and record public information, more specifically, public
police conversations with citizens. Id. at ¶ 39; see also infra Part II.E.4. Accordingly, the
ACLU suit will be referenced often.
12.
See infra Part III.A.
13.
See infra Part III.B.
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if such conversations are not private, without the consent of all of the parties involved.14 The specific elements of the offense include: first,
“[k]nowingly and intentionally us[ing] an eavesdropping devise for the
purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation or intercept[ing], retain[ing], or transcrib[ing] electronic communication . . . .”;15
and second, to do so “with[out] the consent of all of the parties to such conversation . . . .”16 According to the Act, a “conversation means any oral
communication between [two] or more persons regardless of whether one
or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation.”17 To summarize, the
Act disregards expectations of privacy and requires dual consent between
conversing parties before any type of legal recording may take place for any
kind of conversation.18
The Act defines an “eavesdropping device” as “any device capable of
being used to hear or record oral conversation or intercept, retain, or transcribe electronic communications whether such conversation or electronic
communication is conducted in person, by telephone, or by any other means
. . . .”19 In its general application, the Act states that first time offenders
may be convicted of a Class 4 felony and that for any subsequent offenses,
Class 3 felony convictions may be in order.20 These levels of felony charges
are only for general violations of the Act, such as those committed between
two private citizens.21 Far more extreme penalties are in store for those who
violate the Act against any public official, including law enforcement officers.22 Specifically, the Act states that “eavesdropping of . . . conversation[s] . . . between any law enforcement officer, State’s Attorney . . . or a
judge, while in the performance of his or her official duties . . . is a Class 1
felony,”23 which is equivalent to a criminal sexual assault conviction,24 punishable by up to fifteen years incarceration25 and possible fines amounting
to $25,000.26

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Illinois Eavesdropping Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) (2006).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2006).
Id. at (a)(1)(A).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2008).
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a) (2006).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(a) (2008).
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(a) (2000).
See id.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2000).
Id.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(b)(1) (2010).
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30(a) (2010).
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-50(b) (2010).
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THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT OF THE ACT

There was a time in Illinois when audio recording an on-duty police
officer was a legal act in situations where the officer had no constitutionally
protected expectation of privacy.27 The 1994 Amendment to the Act made
“eavesdropping” of on-duty police officers an offense,28 in spite of the 1986
Illinois Supreme Court case People v. Beardsley holding to the contrary.29
In Beardsley, a motorist was arrested for not producing a valid driver’s
license after being pulled over for speeding.30 The defendant was then
placed in the back of the squad car. While the defendant and the two arresting deputy sheriffs waited for the defendant’s car to be removed by a tow
truck, the defendant recorded the conversation taking place between the two
deputy sheriffs in the front of the squad car.31 Consequently, the defendant
was charged with violating the Act even though the officers were fully
aware that the defendant was audio recording them.32
After a series of appeals, the Illinois Supreme Court exculpated the defendant from the charges because, under the circumstances, the two deputy
sheriffs did not intend their conversation to be private and had “impliedly
consented to the recording of their conversation.”33 In other words, the
court held that when police officers are acting in their official public duties,
when they are in public places, and when they are exchanging dialogue at
volumes that are easily overheard by the unaided human ear, law enforcement officers have no “expectation of privacy.”34
Less than a decade later, by Public Act 88-677, the Illinois Legislature
amended the Act to formally define “conversation” as it is presently characterized—“any oral communication between 2 or more persons regardless of
whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a
private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation.”35 Prior to
this Amendment, there was no definition for “conversation” in the Act,36
which left ambiguity for courts to interpret the Act to allow implicit consent

27.
See People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ill. 1986) (holding that police
officers, while in their squad cars with a detained suspect in the backseat, are not entitled to
a reasonable, constitutionally protected expectation of privacy).
28.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2000).
29.
See Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 352-53.
30.
See id. at 347-48.
31.
See id. at 347.
32.
See id. at 348.
33.
Id. at 352.
34.
See Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 352.
35.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2008).
36.
Eavesdropping Act, Pub. Act 88-677, 1994 Ill. Laws 677, ch. 38, ¶ 14-1, § (d).
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of recorded conversations, given the context of how and when the conversation at issue took place.37
The legislative intent of the Act is discernible from an analysis of the
floor debates discussing Public Act 88-677, which reveal that the legislature
sought to protect law enforcement officers from being unexpectedly recorded by unapproved parties.38 During the third Senate floor reading of the
proposed bill on May 20, 1994, Senate sponsor Walter Dudycz, asserted
that the very purpose of the bill was “to reverse the Beardsley eavesdropping case . . . [as a] necess[ity] for officer safety . . . .”39
C.

EAVESDROPPING LAWS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

At this point, in order to more fully understand the principles guiding
the current Act, it is essential to analyze the eavesdropping laws of other
jurisdictions. Recently, in State v. Graber, a citizen of Maryland was arrested for violating the eavesdropping law of that state.40 In Graber, defendant Anthony Graber was recklessly driving his motorcycle down a highway near Baltimore in March of 2010 when suddenly an unmarked police
car cut him off, and abruptly brought his joy ride to an end.41
Graber had a helmet camera operating in order to capture his trip on
film and never had a chance to turn it off before the officer who swerved in
front of him came out of his vehicle in plain attire brandishing a firearm.42
Later, when Graber had returned home, he posted the incident on “YouTube” and as a result, was arrested and imprisoned for violating the Maryland version of the Act.43 The eavesdropping charges were eventually dismissed at trial because the trial judge found that the officer, in the context
of the situation, had “no reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .”44

37.
See Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 352.
38.
See Senate Transcripts, H.R. 356, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 42 (Ill.
1994), available at http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans88/ST052094.pdf.
39.
Id. Exactly why the legislature felt compelled to protect the safety of on-duty
law enforcement officers with regards to eavesdropping will be touched upon in the “Exemptions” section infra Part II.D.
40.
See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7 (3d Cir. Ct.
Sept. 27, 2010).
41.
Id. at *4.
42.
See id.
43.
See id.
44.
Id. at *13-14; accord Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 906 (Pa. 1989)
(holding that a prison guard, under similar circumstances, “would not have been justified in
expecting that his conversation would not be subject to interception.”); accord State v. Flora,
845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that, under the same basic facts, an
arrestee could legally tape record an officer because in that situation, the officer had no
reasonable expectation of privacy).
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Maryland, just like eleven other jurisdictions, including the federal
government, distinguishes heavily between non-private and private conversations in its eavesdropping laws.45 Maryland mandates that consent of all
of the parties involved in a conversation is only required in the latter situation when there is, in-fact, a reasonable expectation of privacy.46 In those
jurisdictions, non-private conversations, for example, those that take place
on a public highway, are not entitled to any type of reasonable expectation
of privacy and do not require consent by all parties involved in order for a
legal audio or video recording of the conversation to take place.47
Conversations involving law enforcement officers in public places
have generally been held to be of the non-private kind in those jurisdictions.48 For that reason, recording an on-duty police officer conducting his
or her public duties in a public place while the officer is exchanging dialogue at volumes easily ascertainable by the unaided human ear is not
deemed an illegal act in those jurisdictions.49 All other jurisdictions which
possess some form of eavesdropping laws only require one person to consent to a recording for any type of electronic documentation to be legal.50

45.
See Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of
the Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 928-30 (1998) (charting all fifty state
and the federal eavesdropping laws of which the federal government, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington all distinguish between private and non-private conversations).
46.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2010) (defining “oral communication,” also known as
“conversation,” as “any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation
that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation . . .”); see also Bast, supra note 45, at 928-30; Graber, 2010 3d Cir. Ct. LEXIS
7, at *13-14.
47.
See, e.g., State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008) (upholding defendant’s
motion to suppress electronically recorded conversations he had with an informant, since,
under the circumstances, he had a “reasonable expectation of privacy”); Gibson v. State of
Maryland, 771 A.2d 536, 544 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (holding that there is no “expectation of privacy” while traveling on a public right of way); Dept. of Agric. & Consumer
Servs. v. Edwards, 654 So. 2d 628, 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that “[f]or an oral
conversation to be protected . . . the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of
privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable”); Bast, supra
note 45, at 882. Under the federal wiretapping statutes and the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes of many states, a private conversation may not be recorded without the consent
of at least one participant; however, the conversants lose their expectation of privacy if their
conversation is loud enough to allow it to be overheard unaided by any electronic audio
interception device. Id. See also id., at 928-30.
48.
See id.; see, e.g., Henlen, 564 A.2d at 906; Flora, 845 P.2d at 1358; see also
Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance, 85 Op. Att’y Gen. 225, n.8 (Md. 2000) (stating that
“many encounters between uniformed police officers and citizens could hardly be characterized as ‘private conversations[,]’” and that it would be difficult to consider otherwise).
49.
See, e.g., id.
50.
See Bast, supra note 45, at 928-30.
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Of the fourteen “two-party consent” jurisdictions, Massachusetts51 and
Illinois52 are the only states which do not distinguish between private and
non-private conversations. In both of these states, it is unlawful to audio
record any conversation without the prior consent of all of those involved,
regardless of whether or not the parties implicated had intended their conversations to be particularly private in nature.53 As a result, Illinois is one of
only two jurisdictions throughout all of the United States that makes it a
criminal act to audio record on-duty law enforcement officers when the
officers have no “reasonable expectation of privacy.”54
D.

EXEMPTIONS IN THE ILLINOIS EAVESDROPPING ACT

The dual consent principle that the Act was built upon, conflicted with
law enforcement efforts to record interactions with citizens. In order to
remedy that very issue, the Illinois Legislature created exemptions for police officers to electronically document conversations between themselves
and civilians without civilian consent.55
The Act states, in pertinent part, that exemptions for law enforcement
officers include “[r]ecordings made simultaneously with the use of an in-car
video camera recording of an oral conversation between a uniformed peace
officer . . . and a person in the presence of the peace officer . . . [during]
enforcement stop[s] . . . .”56 Exemptions also include “[r]ecordings of utterances made by a person while in the presence of a uniformed peace officer
and while an occupant of a police vehicle . . .”57 and “[r]ecordings made
simultaneously with a video camera recording during the use of a taser or
similar weapon . . . .”58 Put simply, these exemptions allow police officers
to record almost anything that any civilian says while in the officer’s presence, regardless of whether or not that individual had an expectation of
privacy when the speech at issue was uttered.
This explicit double standard of allowing police officers to record civilians without their consent, without exception, is rationalized by the Illi51.
See id. at 857-59; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(2) (2010)
(“‘[O]ral communication’ means speech . . . .”).
52.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2010) (according to the Act, a “conversation
means any oral communication between 2 or more persons regardless of whether one or
more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation”).
53.
See id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(2) (2010); see also Bast,
supra note 45, at 857-59.
54.
See supra Part II.A-C.
55.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3 (2010).
56.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(h) (2010).
57.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(h-5) (2010).
58.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(h-10) (2010).
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nois Legislature, as alluded to previously, under the guise of officer
safety.59 The Illinois Legislature amended the exemption sections of the Act
in 2009 to its current construction with adjustments to section (h), and also
introduced sections (h-5), (h-10), and (h-15)60 with the intent to better protect law enforcement officers from false accusations.61
On April 2, 2009, Illinois House of Representatives sponsor Lisa
Dugan, stated of the introduced legislation that “it’s a tool for law enforcement, but I also believe it is a tool for the citizens, too, because then there is
actual proof of what was said or what was done.”62 Recognizing the necessity for electronic documentation in citizen-officer encounters, instead of
abandoning dual consent, the Legislature was willing to carve out an exception to the dual consent principle for the sole use of police officers in order
to better protect officer interests while secondarily protecting the rights and
interests of citizens,63 a very commendable rationale indeed.
E.

ILLINOIS CASES DEALING WITH THE CURRENT ACT

Since the 1994 Amendment to the Act eliminated the necessity for the
trier of fact to determine “reasonable expectation of privacy” via adopting a
broad definition for “conversation,”64 there have been a number of cases
that have specifically dealt with citizens electronically documenting public
police conduct.65 The state’s attorneys’ new effective weapons against pub59.
See Senate Transcripts, H.R. 356, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 42 (May
20, 1994), available at http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans88/ST052094.pdf.
60.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3 (2010).
61.
See House Transcripts, H.R. 1057, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 83-84
(Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans96/09600038.pdf.
62.
Id. (referencing filed complaints by disgruntled citizens).
63.
See id.
64.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2010).
65.
See Complaint at 1, Illinois v. Parteet, No. 10-CF-48 (16th Cir. Jan. 2, 2010);
see also Complaint at 1, Illinois v. Allison, No. 09-CF-50 (2nd Cir. Apr. 3, 2009); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1-17, Illinois v. Drew,
No.10-CR-4601 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. Ill. March 26, 2010); Indictment, Illinois v. Thompson,
No. 04-CF-1609 (6th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill. Sept. 2, 2004) (This is a non-exhaustive list of cases).
See ACLU Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 25(e), 40 (noting that there have been at
least nine total defendants prosecuted for violating the Act against police officers in the State
of Illinois since the 1994 amendment). Illinois v. Allison, No. 09-CF-50 (2nd Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill.
Sept. 15, 2011), is a particularly interesting case, as it has seen extensive national media
coverage since September of 2011 from outlets such as the HUFFINGTON POST, Glenn Beck,
and the DRUDGE REPORT. Sarah Ruholl, State to appeal Allison decision, DAILY NEWS
ONLINE,
(Sept.
23,
2011),
http://www.robdailynews.com/Main.asp?SectionID=2&SubSectionID=2&ArticleID=9114.
In Allison, the defendant, Michael Allison, was charged with five counts of violating the Act
stemming from an ordinance violation dispute. Order on Motion to Declare 720 ILCS 5/14
Unconstitutional at 2, Illinois v. Allison, No. 09-CF-50 (2nd Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill. Sept. 15, 2011),
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lic official eavesdropping perpetrators—the broad definition of conversation, coupled with the harsh penalties at stake for violating the law against
those public officials,66 have proven to be formidable foes for each of the
defendants who have been subjected to prosecution under the Act.
1.

The Filmmaker

Ten years after the Illinois Legislature ratified the new broad definition of “conversation” to the Act, in People v. Thompson, a couple of individuals were subjected to prosecution for violating the Act against a police
officer.67 In Thompson, defendant Patrick D. Thompson, along with his
partner Martel Miller, chose to make a documentary of police interaction
with citizens of the City of Champaign due to a number of complaints over
the years about police mistreatment of African Americans in the community.68 Thompson and his partner filmed several encounters over a span of
nearly three months without incident until August 7, 2004, when they
filmed an African-American bicyclist receiving a citation from a Champaign police officer for riding without a headlight.69 After the officer they
were filming suspected what the two men were up to, the camera was con-

available at http://iln.isba.org/sites/default/files/blog/2011/09/Cell%20phones%20and%20
eavesdropping/Allison%20order.pdf. If convicted, Allison could face up to seventy-five
years in prison. Id. The presiding Judge David K. Frankland sustained the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges for the Act’s unconstitutional violations of substantive due process and the First Amendment right to gather information. Id. at 12. The court pointed out
that, “[t]here are no limitations [to the Act]. There are no time, place and manner restrictions
to consider under the statute as it imposes a blanket rule on forbidding all recordings in such
case without the consent of the public servant.” Id. at 11-12. Unfortunately for the defendant,
his fate is still undetermined, as the state chose to appeal the court ordered dismissal directly
to the Illinois Supreme Court on October 14, 2011. Allison Ruling Will Go to Illinois Supreme Court, DAILY NEWS ONLINE, (Oct. 18, 2011 1:20:00 PM), http://www.robdailynews.
com/main.asp?SectionID=2&SubSectionID=2&ArticleID=9223.
66.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2010) (violating the Act against a public
official is a Class 1 felony); see also 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30(a) (2010) (violating
the Act against a public official is punishable by up to 15 years incarceration); 730 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-50(b) (2010) (stating that fines for violating the Act against a public
official could amount to $25,000).
67.
Motion to Dismiss at 1, Illinois v. Thompson, No. 04-CF-1609 (6th Jud. Cir. Ct.
Ill. Oct. 4, 2004); see also Jon Yates, Editorial, Rights, Eavesdropping Law Collide in Filmmakers’ Case, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2004, § Metro; Zone C, at 1.
68.
See Champaign Police Department Supplemental Narrative Report at 1, Illinois
v. Thompson, No. 04-CF-1609 (6th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill. Sept. 3, 2004); see also Yates, supra
note 67, at 1.
69.
See Champaign Police Department Supplemental Narrative Report, supra note
68, at 1; see also Yates, supra note 67, at 1.

396

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

fiscated.70 Subsequent to sending their documentary to a local television
station, the two men were indicted for violating the Act.71
The Champaign County State’s Attorney eventually dropped the
charges against Miller after the City Manager and Police Chief requested
that the eavesdropping charges against both men be dismissed.72 Following
a series of setbacks, the eavesdropping charges against Thompson were
dropped as well.73 Both Thompson and Miller ultimately filed a civil action
in federal court against the City of Champaign and county officials as well
as the city’s police officers for violating their constitutionally protected
First Amendment rights.74 Regrettably though, the case was settled for an
undisclosed sum and a decision on the Act’s validity was never held.75
2.

The Student

As mentioned earlier, there has been a recent case in DeKalb, Illinois
specifically dealing with the electronic documentation of police officers,
People v. Parteet.76 In Parteet, two brothers, Adrian and Fanon Parteet, on
November 24, 2009, were passengers in a vehicle that was pulled over in
the parking lot of a McDonald’s restaurant on the suspicion of driving under the influence.77 The two brothers were eventually arrested for violating
the Act after using their cell-phones to record the conversation taking place
between themselves and the officers without the prior consent of the officers.78
70.
See Champaign Police Department Supplemental Narrative Report, supra note
68, at 1; see also Yates, supra note 67, at 1.
71.
See Indictment, People v. Thompson, No. 04-CF-1609 (6th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill. Sep.
2, 2004); see also Yates, supra note 67, at 1.
72.
The City Manager claimed that he wrote a formal letter to the State’s Attorney
requesting that the charges be dismissed because the sought after effect of notifying the
public of acceptable and unacceptable electronic police documentation had already been
accomplished. See State’s Motion to Dismiss, at Illinois v. Thompson, No. 04-CF-1609 (6th
Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill. Sep. 24, 2004); see also Yates, supra note 67, at 1.
73.
See Schlikerman & Mack, supra note 4, at 1. Thompson was dealing with the
possibility of other more serious felony convictions at the same time that the eavesdropping
charges were brought forth. See Yates, supra note 67, at 1. Consequently, the State’s Attorney was reluctant in letting Thompson off on the lesser charge of eavesdropping while the
more serious charges were still pending. Id.
74.
See Schlikerman & Mack, supra note 4, at 1.
75.
See id.
76.
See Complaint at 1, Illinois v. Parteet, No. 10-CF-48 (16th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill. Jan.
2, 2010).
77.
See Schlikerman & Mack, supra note 4, at 1.
78.
See Defendant’s Motion to Quash Unlawful Stop, Detention, Search and Arrest/Miranda Warning Violation at 1, Illinois v. Parteet, No. 10-CF-48 (16th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill.
Jan. 15, 2010).
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The defendant’s motion to quash suggested that after the driver had
proven he was not under the influence, the officers “detain[ed] the Defendant[s] unlawfully without articulable suspicion or probable cause . . . asking questions without Miranda Warnings.”79 In the eyes of the defendants,
this unlawful detainment, which coincided with unsettling past experiences
with officers, was compelling enough reason for the brothers to document
the encounter with their cellular telephones.80 After a preliminary examination, however, probable cause was found and the brothers were forced to
plead guilty to the misdemeanor of “attempted eavesdropping” in order to
avoid the full extent of the law,81 which could have led to felony convictions,82 heavy fines,83 and substantial prison time.84 The court ordered them
to apologize to the officers and to delete their recordings.85
3.

The Artist

Just over a week after the Parteet brothers were arrested for violating
the Act, on December 2, 2009, Christopher Drew of Chicago, Illinois was
arrested for breaching the Act with respect to police officers as well.86 On
that late autumn day, Mr. Drew was on the public sidewalk of State Street
in front of Macy’s department store.87 Mr. Drew is a professional artist and
was attempting to sell his work for $1 along State Street in order to challenge a Chicago City Ordinance which prohibited peddling art on public
sidewalks.88 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Drew was approached by a police officer and told to immediately cease his conduct or face arrest pursuant to the
prohibitive city ordinance.89 Mr. Drew refused to stop selling his art be-

79.
Id.
80.
See id.; see also Schlikerman & Mack, supra note 4, at 1.
81.
See Guilty Plea and Jury Waiver, Illinois v. Parteet, No. 10-CF-48 (16th Jud.
Cir. Ct. Ill. April 29, 2010); see also Schlikerman & Mack, supra note 4, at 1.
82.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2010) (violating the Act against a public
official is a Class 1 felony).
83.
See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30(a) (2010) (violating the Act against a
public official is punishable by up to fifteen years incarceration).
84.
See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-50(b) (2010) (noting that fines for violating
the Act against a public official could amount to $25,000).
85.
Order of Court Supervision, Illinois v. Parteet, No. 10-CF-48 (16th Jud. Cir. Ct.
Ill. April 29, 2010); see also Schlikerman, supra note 4, at 1.
86.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss at 4, People
v. Drew, No. 10-CR-4601 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. Ill. 2010), available at http://www.cdrew.com/blog/free-speech-artists-movement/motion-to-dismiss-drew-final.pdf.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 4-5.
89.
Id.
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cause he believed the ordinance violated his constitutional rights, and was
consequently arrested.90
Once Mr. Drew arrived at the police station, officers searched his possessions and found a running tape recorder and further charged him with
violating the Act for secretly recording the conversation he had with the
arresting officer.91 As of October 2010, Mr. Drew was still going through
the criminal process and all signs suggest that his intentions are to challenge
the law by whatever means necessary, up to and including, appealing any
adverse decision to which he may be subjected,92 since, as he states,
“[p]eople ‘have the right to defend themselves and bring evidence of what
the police said to them in public and bring it into public court.’”93
All of the preceding cases have one fundamental fact in common—in
every single situation, the officers implicated had no “reasonable expectation of privacy” as defined and understood in all but one of the other dualconsent jurisdictions94 and also previously in Illinois under the Beardsley
precedent.95 The officers involved were indeed acting in their official public
duties; they were on public streets and sidewalks, and they were all engaged
in conversations at volumes that were easily overheard by the unaided human ear, and thus, shared no “reasonable expectation of privacy.”96
4.

The Union

In response to these situations and others similar across the state,97 the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Illinois filed a suit on August
18, 2010 in federal court in Chicago against Cook County State’s Attorney
Anita Alvarez that challenged the validity of the Act as violative of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.98 In its mission to fight for
90.
Id.
91.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss, supra note
86, at 5.
92.
See Christopher Drew, Birthday to Birthday – One Year of Resistance, CDREW.COM (Oct. 9, 2010, 11:07 PM), http://www.c-drew.com/blog/2010/10/09/birthday-tobirthday-%E2%80%93-one-year-of-resistance/ (stating on his website that “[a]s soon as we
defeat this felony charge we will be initiating law suits of our own. We will sue the City for
artists [sic] rights and the State to create case law on the eavesdropping law that forces them
to change these unconstitutional laws.”).
93.
Schlikerman & Mack, supra note 4, at 1.
94.
See supra, Part II.C.
95.
See People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ill. 1986) (holding that in order
to convict a defendant of eavesdropping, the aggrieved party had to have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
96.
See supra Part II.E.1-3.
97.
For a compilation of cases, see ACLU Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶
40.
98.
Schlikerman & Mack, supra note 4, at 1.
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the civil rights and liberties of individual citizens, the ACLU asserts that it
is standard practice for the organization to assemble information about government events that occur in public places with electronic documentation.99
The ACLU further states that it is standard practice for them to release information about open government conduct that is gathered via electronic
means to the general public,100 and that it must present this gathered information to government bodies in order to petition the government for redress
of grievances.101
While the ACLU observes public events and the practices of government officials, one of its main focuses is to monitor on-duty police conduct
and it intended to engage in a formal program that accomplished that
goal.102 In order to perform this task with the utmost effectiveness, the
ACLU claimed that it was imperative for it to electronically record those
events.103 The ACLU conceded that most police officers lawfully conduct
their official duties; however, it did point out that some officers have a tendency to abuse their authority.104 These efforts, the ACLU claimed, were
intended “not only to observe and record the manner in which government
employees perform their duties, but also to improve police practices, and to
deter and detect any unlawful police interference with constitutional liberties.”105
In light of defendant Cook County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez’s
official duties, to prosecute all activity considered criminal under the laws
of the State of Illinois, including public official eavesdropping,106 the
ACLU emphasized reasonable fears that if it undertook the aforesaid efforts
to electronically document public police conduct, it would be prosecuted by
the defendant.107 Due to this chilling effect on First Amendment activity,
the ACLU sought injunctive relief against defendant’s prosecutorial duties
with respect to the Act and its prohibition on recording public police con-

99.
ACLU Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ 11.
100.
Id. at ¶ 12.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at ¶ 14.
103.
See ACLU Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ 35 (maintaining that if relief is not
granted, the ACLU will suffer “irreparable harm”).
104.
Id. at ¶ 17; see also Hickman, supra note 2; Futterman, supra note 2.
105.
ACLU Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ 14.
106.
Id. at ¶ 8.
107.
See id. at ¶¶ 32-33. In the ACLU’s amended complaint filed on November 18,
2010, the ACLU points out that its fears of facing prosecution from defendant stem not only
from her capacity as the State’s Attorney, but also from the fact that she is currently prosecuting two cases under the Act. ACLU Amended Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 25(c), 40.
The ACLU also states that over the past six years, at least seven other Illinois State’s Attorneys have prosecuted roughly nine defendants under the Act. Id. at ¶ 25(e).
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duct.108 Furthermore, the ACLU asked for a declaration that such conduct
be deemed constitutionally protected under the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.109 More specifically, the ACLU asserted that:
[T]he Illinois Eavesdropping Act . . . as applied to the
audio recording of police officers, without the consent of
the officers, when (a) the officers are performing their public duties, (b) the officers are in public places, (c) the officers are speaking at a volume audible to the unassisted human ear, and (d) the manner of recording is otherwise lawful . . . . [V]iolates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.110
Unfortunately, without even discussing intermediate scrutiny, let alone
a strict scrutiny analysis, the court ardently declared that “[t]he ACLU has
not alleged a constitutional right or injury under the First Amendment.
Rather, the ACLU proposes an unprecedented expansion of the First
Amendment.”111 This proclamation by the court is interesting considering
the fact that forty-eight other jurisdictions, including federal, regard this
kind of activity as perfectly legal under the First Amendment.112 Further108.
Id. at ¶ 4.
109.
Id.
110.
ACLU Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ 1.
111.
ACLU v. Alvarez, No. 10-CV-05235, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088, at *13
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2011). Prior to the court’s decision on the validity of a First Amendment
challenge, defendant Alvarez’s motion to dismiss was granted by the court citing a lack of
standing on behalf of the ACLU, since “[n]o imminent threat of injury to the ACLU [was]
alleged.” Id. at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2010). The ACLU subsequently filed an amended complaint which cured the standing issue and forced the court to address the First Amendment
challenge. See id. at *10.
112.
See supra Part II.C; see also infra Part III.A.2. Thus, the phrase “unprecedented
expansion” that the court employs, resides in the realm of hyperbole. See ACLU v. Alvarez,
No. 10-CV-05235, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088, at *13. Interestingly enough, as discussed
in the background section above, the Act protects judges to the same degree as police officers, in that violating the Act against any judge will result in a Class 1 felony as well. See
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2010). In this case however, the court justified its position
by claiming that the ACLU failed to cite to any Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit cases
which explicitly guaranteed the right to audio record under the First Amendment. ACLU v.
Alvarez, No. 10-CV-05235, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088, at *10. The court also cites a
Seventh Circuit case which held that “the right to record a public event” is not absolute. Id.
at *10 (citing Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir. 1997)). At the very
least however, under a constitutional challenge, any law which regulates recording of public
events or conversations is subject to an intermediate scrutiny analysis. See infra Part
III.A.4.ii. In September of 2011, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments
in ACLU v. Alvarez. Natasha Korecki, Judge Casts Doubt on ACLU Challenge to Law Forbidding Audio Recording of Cops, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011 5:26PM),
http://www.suntimes.com/news/crime /7639298-418/judge-casts-doubt-on-aclu-challenge-
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more, not only did the court fail to subject the Act to an intermediate or
strict scrutiny analysis, but it also completely overlooked other arguments
that the ACLU raised related to privacy and public policy.113 The ACLU
claimed that unless it was awarded sought after injunctive and declaratory
relief, it would suffer “irreparable harm.”114 As it turns out though, masses
of others will also continue to be irreparably harmed by the current Act—
the law-abiding citizens of the State of Illinois. “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”115
III.
A.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CHANGING THE LAW

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”116
Amendment I of the U.S. Constitution
1.

Incorporation of the First Amendment under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment

The people of the State of Illinois are prepared to immediately monitor
police through peaceful engagement of audio recording on-duty officers in
public places, as many are unaware that there is even such a law which proto-law-forbidding-audio-recording-of-cops.html. Highly esteemed Chief Justice Posner had
little issue expressing his concerns about the prospect of overturning the Act, stating: “‘If
you permit the audio recordings, they’ll be a lot more eavesdropping . . . . There’s going to
be a lot of this snooping around by reporters and bloggers’ . . . . ‘Yes, it’s a bad thing. There
is such a thing as privacy.’” Id. Evidently Justice Posner believes his privacy interests, as a
public official, will always outweigh the First Amendment interests of the citizenry, even in
public places. Justice Posner’s disposition towards a potential declaration of the Act’s unconstitutionality is not only unwarranted, but simply erroneous given current First Amendment precedent and public policy concerns that necessitate an overthrow of the Act. See
infra Part III.
113.
See ACLU v. Alvarez, No. 10-CV-05235, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088. “Completely overlooked” denotes that the court did not address these issues at all.
114.
ACLU Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ 35; see also Schnell v. City of Chicago,
407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969) (“The presumption of irreparable harm is manifest . . .
where it is alleged that first amendment rights have been chilled as a result of both government action and inaction.”).
115.
This is a Latin phrase that translates to, “[w]ho will guard the guards themselves?” David Isenberg, Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?, HUFFINGTON POST, (May 31, 2010
12:25
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/quis-custodiet-ipsoscust_b_595304.html. It has also been translated as “[w]ho watches the watchmen?” Id.
116.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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hibits doing so.117 Consequently, the question remains, is this activity constitutionally protected by the First Amendment against state legislative infringements?
In the recent Supreme Court decision McDonald v. City of Chicago,
the Court laid out the contemporary test to resolve the question of whether
or not a fundamental right is safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against state regulation.118 In order to determine
whether or not a right granted to United States citizens in the Bill of Rights
of the United States Constitution is granted to citizens of the several states
as well, the Court must decide whether the right is fundamental to our
“scheme of ordered liberty”119 or whether this right is “‘deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.’”120
The Court confirmed how, as of 2010, by piecemeal, nearly every provision of the Bill of Rights has been incorporated in accordance with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for application to the individual states.121 As far as the First Amendment is concerned, however, the
Court pointed to the fact that every provision found within its gambit, including; the “establishment clause,”122 the “free exercise clause,”123 the
“freedom of assembly clause,”124 the “free speech clause,”125 and finally the
“freedom of press clause”126 have all been incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.127
Once rights are held to be fundamental to our “scheme of ordered liberty”128 and “‘deeply rooted in [our] Nation’s history and tradition,’”129 the
protected rights at issue “are all to be enforced against the States under the
117.
See, e.g., supra note 107 (discussing a small sample of Illinois citizens who, in
recent years, were openly oblivious to the Act’s existence and were subjected to prosecution
pursuant to the Act).
118.
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
119.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
120.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
121.
See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034-35. The Court listed the provisions which
have yet to be fully incorporated prior to the Court’s decision in McDonald: (1) the Second
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms, (2) the Sixth Amendment’s right to a unanimous
jury verdict, (3) the Third Amendment’s guard against forced quartering of soldiers, (4) the
Fifth Amendment’s requirement of grand jury indictments, (5) the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial in civil cases, and (6) the Eighth Amendment’s ban on extreme fines. Id.
122.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
123.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
124.
See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
125.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
126.
See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
127.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010).
128.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
129.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those
personal rights against federal encroachment.”130 In other words, states are
barred from subjectively applying their own interpretations of the protected
rights granted to citizens of the United States by the Bill of Rights, which in
many instances have been inconsistent dilutions of the federal version.131
Clearly, the breadth and magnitude of First Amendment protections are part
of our fundamental “scheme of ordered liberty,”132 and thus must be safeguarded under state regulations to the same degree as the federal level.
Nevertheless, the issue persists—do those guaranteed protections, granted
under the First Amendment, which may not be infringed upon without the
due process of law, encompass monitoring public police conduct via electronic audio recordings?
2.

The First Amendment Protects Citizens’ Rights to Gather, Receive and
Record Information

The free speech and free press clauses of the First Amendment protect
citizens’ rights to gather, receive, and record information for the purposes
of publicizing that information and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.133 The Supreme Court has never specifically dealt with the
issue of whether or not audio recording on-duty police officers and other
public officials in public places is a protected First Amendment activity.
Nevertheless, the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
have all explicitly held in a number of decisions that individual citizens are
permitted under the First Amendment to electronically document or photograph the activity of law enforcement officers and other public officials in
public forums.134
Implicit in each citizen’s First Amendment right to gather, receive, and
record public governmental conduct is the right to photograph those events.
In Schnell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit upheld a claim against the
City of Chicago, which alleged that through intimidation and force, police
“interfer[ed] with the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to gather and report
news, and to photograph news events.”135 In addition, in Williamson v.
130.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
131.
See id. at 10.
132.
See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
133.
See infra Part III.A.2.
134.
See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999); Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155 (11th Cir.
1995); Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994); Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d
558 (7th Cir. 1970); Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969).
135.
Schnell, 407 F.2d at 1085. This was a class action suit filed by media personnel
against the City for interfering with their attempts to photograph public officials/officers and
other news events during the 1968 Democratic National Convention. Id.
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Mills, the Eleventh Circuit expressly held that “[t]aking photographs [of an
undercover police officer] at a public event is a facially innocent act” and
that arresting a patron for doing so is violative of the Fourth Amendment
since not even “arguable probable cause” could be discerned from such an
act.136
Not only is photographing public events and officials a protected First
Amendment activity, video and audio recording of public government conduct is also protected under the umbrella of First Amendment jurisprudence. In Smith v. City of Cumming, an aggrieved couple filed suit against
the City of Cumming for preventing them from videotaping police conduct
as violative of their First Amendment right to gather, receive, and record
information.137 The Eleventh Circuit held that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public
property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”138
The court further emphasized how with regards to First Amendment rights,
the rights of the individual citizen and that of the media are the same.139
Beyond the Smith precedent, the Eleventh Circuit protected the right of
citizens to electronically document public officials in public forums a previous time in Blackston v. Alabama.140 In Blackston, the court banned a
restriction on the complainants from audio recording the deliberation meetings of an Alabama child support guideline committee.141 The court stated
that the committee judge violated the plaintiff’s freedom of expression
rights granted to each citizen under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.142
Furthermore, and as mentioned previously, the First and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have also both protected the right of individual citizens to record public official conduct in public places.143 In Dorfman v.
Meiszner, the Seventh Circuit struck down a ban on radio broadcasting in a
federal building that contained both federal district courthouses and federal
136.
Williamson, 65 F.3d at 158.
137.
See Smith, 212 F.3d at 1332.
138.
Id. at 1333. The court did indeed recognize a First Amendment right to photograph or videotape police conduct, but stated that this right would be subject to “reasonable
time, manner and place restrictions.” Id.
139.
Id; See also Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 25 (recognizing that an independent journalist has a First Amendment protected right to electronically document public government
meetings); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (stating that with
regards to public information, the general public and the media are on equal footing).
140.
See Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994).
141.
Id. at 121.
142.
See id. at 120. For an explanation on how audio/video recording of events is
considered freedom of expression and protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, see infra Part III.A.3.
143.
See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
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offices;144 the ban was intended “to promote the integrity of the court’s proceedings.”145 The court determined that extending the ban beyond the floors
of the building that included the courts to the floors where there were no
courtrooms, to the main lobby, and to the plaza and surrounding outside
areas “is broader than is necessary to accomplish the stated purpose.”146
Lastly, in Iacobucci v. Boulter, the First Circuit upheld a claim against
a police officer who was sued for falsely arresting a citizen for using a recording device to document public officials during an open public meeting.147 The court declared that “because [plaintiff’s] activities were peaceful
. . . and done in the exercise of his First Amendment rights, [the officer]
lacked the authority to stop [him].”148 It is evident that a number of circuit
courts of appeals, including the Seventh Circuit, have recognized citizens’
First Amendment right to gather, receive, and record open public official
conduct. These holdings directly implicate what the people seek to accomplish and each one of these holdings protects their right to carry onward in
their efforts.
3.

Freedom of Expression

In addition to holding that citizens have the right to record public governmental meetings, the Blackston court also noted that the lower court
judge’s “attempt to prohibit [plaintiffs] from recording the proceedings did
have some impact on how they were able to obtain access to and present
information about the Committee and its proceedings,” consequently, inhibiting plaintiffs’ protected First Amendment rights to expressive conduct.149
In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court discussed just what exactly “ex-

144.
See Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 1970).
145.
Id. at 562.
146.
Id.
147.
See Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1999).
148.
Id. at 25. In fact, since this Comment was initially authored, in August of 2011,
the First Circuit had the opportunity to deal with the exact issue of whether or not a private
citizen has a constitutionally protected First Amendment right to audio record a police officer in public. See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). In Glik, the plaintiff sued
police officers for violating his First Amendment right to gather and record information, and
his Fourth Amendment right against arrest without probable cause. Id. at 79. In their FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the defendant officers argued that the doctrine of “qualified immunity” barred any civil suit related to the plaintiff’s arrest because the rights that
plaintiff averred were violated by the officers were not “well-established.” Id. at 81-82. The
court, citing many of the same cases cited here-in, held with respect to the First Amendment
claim, “[b]asic First Amendment principles, along with case law from this and other circuits,
answer” the question of whether or not there is a constitutionally protected right to record
police carrying out their duties in public “unambiguously in the affirmative.” Id. at 82.
149.
Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994).
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pressive conduct,” also called “freedom of expression,” entails.150 In Johnson, a young man faced criminal prosecution for burning an American flag
pursuant to a Texas statute which forbade such conduct;151 the issue was
whether or not doing so was expressive conduct protected under the free
speech clause of the First Amendment.152 The test that the Court used to
decide the aforementioned issue was this: “whether ‘an intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and whether the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’”153
Once again, the Supreme Court has never specifically dealt with the
issue of whether or not audio recording public officials is protected First
Amendment expressive activity. Yet, beyond the Eleventh Circuit’s holding
in Blackston that recording public officials is protected expressive conduct,154 in Thompson v. City of Clio, an Alabama district court helped clarify the issue by holding that if a restriction on a complainant’s desire to
record a government body “has some impact, however small or incidental,
on how he is able to obtain access to and present such information [such a
restriction] regulates conduct protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment.”155
Thus, if a regulation restricts not only a patron’s accessibility to desired information that will be subsequently “expressed” to an audience, but
also the means of accessibility to that information, such a regulation restricts freedom of expression that is protected by the First Amendment. In
the present situation, the people seek to use electronic recording devices for
the purpose of documenting open audible conversations that police officers
have with citizens in public ways, while the officers are performing their
public duties, and in an otherwise lawful manner for the purposes of disseminating that information to the public and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances. The Act, as it currently stands, impedes upon the
people’s means of accessibility to that desired information by making it
illegal for them to use any electronic device to record those conversations,
consequently restricting their right to freedom of expression granted under
the free speech clause of the First Amendment.
It is very easy to underplay the significance of audio recording devices
in this situation granted that taking photographs, creating muted videotapes,
or documenting events with a pen implicating public police conduct do not
violate the Act.156 Still, the importance of audio recording devices to be
150.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
151.
See id. at 399.
152.
See id.
153.
Id. at 404. This test was first utilized in the 1974 Supreme Court decision
Spence v. Washington, 518 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
154.
See Blackston, 30 F.3d at 120.
155.
Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
156.
See supra Part III.A.2.

2012]

WATCHING THE WATCHMEN

407

respected as a valid medium of expression is not only necessary for the
people to accomplish their goals, as the ACLU has stated, it is absolutely
imperative in view of the fact that “the initial action of making the audio
recording is integral to the process of creating expression.”157 The ultimate
goal of overturning the Act is to provide unmodified ample documentation
of public police conduct, including spoken words, to most effectively curtail police abuses on citizens,158 which in many instances have included
verbal threats and assaults.159
Citizens of Illinois, of other states, and of foreign nations all use permeating technologies such as cell phone video cameras to document events
and spoken words that occur on a daily basis.160 Not only do individuals
document these witnessed public events, but they willingly share these findings with others via the internet, media, or otherwise.161 As Justice Kennedy
recently avowed:
The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citi157.
Plaintiff’s Combined Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Response in Opposition to Defendant’s. Motion to Dismiss at 3, ACLU v. Alvarez, No. 10CV-05235 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/ACLU-v-Alvarez-PI-reply-MTD-response-10-6-10.pdf.
158.
See id. at 4 (stating that it is essential to paint a full picture of the events in
question by including audio recordings in order to authenticate and “enhance . . . efforts in
educating the general public, reforming government policies, and even resolving testimonial
disputes”).
159.
See Letter from Robert F. Rosenwald, ACLU Found. of Fla., to Matti H. Bower,
Mayor,
City
of
Miami
Beach,
at
2
(Feb.
3,
2010),
http://www.aclufl.org/STRICKLAND_Letter_to_Bower.pdf (quoting an officer’s verbal
assaults on a homosexual man saying such things as, “[w]e know what you’re doing here.
We’re sick of all the fucking fags in the neighborhood” and that he was going to “get it good
in jail”). See also Annie Sweeney, Officer Investigated After Traffic Stop Recorded, CHI.
TRIB. (Mar. 19, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-03-19/news/ct-met-policeracial-comments-20100319_1_chicago-police-officer-driver-threatened (noting that when a
driver asked a police officer why he was stopped, the police officer said that he usually stops
people “‘because they are black.’”); Caught on Cell Phone: Chicago Police Officer Making
Racist
Remark
When
Pulling
Over
Driver,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fdv4xeaSSTQ; Authoritarian/Totalitarianism – Police
Threats And Verbal Abuse, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyFXNcKjqdg
(last visited Jan. 2, 2011) (capturing an officer verbally threatening and assaulting a citizen
shouting “[d]o you want to try me tonight? . . . I will ruin your fucking night . . . . Do you
want to go to jail for some fucking reason I can come up with? . . . ever get smart mouth
with a cop again, I’ll show you what a cop does . . . we will ruin your career and life”).
160.
See David Bauder, Cell-Phone Videos Transforming TV News, WASH. POST
(Jan.
7,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/01/07/AR2007010700473.html.
161.
See id. (pointing to events such as the Saddam Hussein execution, which was
captured via a cell phone video camera).
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zens must be free to use new forms, and new forums, for
the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the
people, and the Government may not prescribe the means
used to conduct it.162
Accordingly, in this situation, flatly denying citizens the right to utilize
recording devices as a medium of expression, which is a conduit to political
discussion, goes against everything the First Amendment stands for.163 If
that right is infringed upon by an ordinance or state regulation of any kind,
how rigorously must a court scrutinize the validity of such a law?
4.

Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny

The scrutiny level that a court chooses to apply in a case goes a long
way in ultimately determining the outcome of the issue at hand. If the court
applies strict scrutiny, as Gerald Gunther famously once said about this
standard of review: “strict in theory and fatal in fact,”164 the regulation will
almost always be struck down. With respect to determining the appropriate
level of scrutiny in a situation where a citizen or citizens seeks to audio
record a public official in a public forum, the Blackston court gives guidance yet again.165
i.

The Case for Strict Scrutiny

In Blackston, the court held that in a free speech claim, a regulation or
restriction on freedom of expression which imposes viewpoint or speaker
discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny.166 Once again the Supreme Court

162.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (quoting
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 341 (2003), partially overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
163.
See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (stating that the
“function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”) See also e.g., Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”).
164.
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972).
165.
See Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994).
166.
See id.
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has a case on point in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.167 In Young,
the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether or not the First
Amendment was violated by a City of Detroit zoning ordinance that regulated the location of adult entertainment businesses.168 The Court stated that
the government regulation on freedom of expression must be neutral and
that “its regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or
hostility for the point of view being expressed by the communicator.”169 If
the regulation is viewpoint or speaker discriminatory, then it would be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis and would be struck down unless it was
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”170
Moreover, the nature in which the Act is constructed also calls into
question whether or not the regulation against audio recording on-duty public officials is content neutral. In Turner v. FCC, the Supreme Court stated
that “[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content
neutral is not always a simple task . . . . As a general rule, laws that by their
terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the
ideas or views expressed are content based.”171 In another case, Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, the Court stated how it must look to the purpose behind the regulation and that in general, “[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is ‘justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech.’”172 Additionally, “regulations enacted
for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment”173 and are thus subject to strict scrutiny.174
The Act, as it is currently constructed blatantly engenders viewpoint
and speaker discrimination, which consequently makes the Act content
based in nature. As discussed previously, the Act makes it illegal for anyone to audio record any conversation without the prior consent of all of the

167.
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 50 (1976).
168.
See id.
169.
Id. at 67 (emphasis added); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)
(“[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . .
.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that a regulation on conduct
must be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression”).
170.
See Blackston, 30 F.3d at 120; see also Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp.
1066, 1072 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (holding specifically that strict scrutiny is triggered when there
is either a viewpoint or content-based regulation on audio recording public officials).
171.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994).
172.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
173.
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
174.
See Blackston, 30 F.3d at 120.
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parties involved.175 This principle known as dual consent, albeit frustrating
in its capacity to indirectly inhibit First Amendment activity,176 does not
deliberately create viewpoint or speaker discrimination so long as it does
not distinguish groups of citizens, i.e., applies equally to citizens and public
officials alike.
Yet, the exemption that the Illinois Legislature subsequently incorporated into the Act of allowing police officers to record virtually every conversation they have with citizens, and not the other way around,177 is tantamount to explicit viewpoint and speaker discrimination, thusly contentbased. The police exemption allows officers to express information gathered, received, and recorded of interactions they have with citizens, but
silences and even punishes178 citizens who wish to exercise that very same
First Amendment right. As the Supreme Court stated in City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, “[e]xemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium
of speech . . . diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.”179
Accordingly, in order for the Act to be upheld in a court of law, it must
be strictly scrutinized and “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”180 As applied to this situation, the Act cannot satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis for two primary reasons. First, the Act is not adequately “narrowly tailored” in that it completely bans all single consent recordings of
conversations without taking into consideration the private or non-private
nature of the conversation at issue. If the Illinois Legislature’s intent was to
protect the privacy interests of on-duty police officers, then the least over175.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a) (2006) (requiring consent of all parties
involved); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2008). According to the Act, a “conversation means any oral communication between 2 or more persons regardless of whether one
or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation.” Id.
176.
Dual consent inhibits First Amendment activity simply because of the fact that
individuals seeking to electronically document daily interactions must first receive permission from all those involved, contrary to the principle of single consent which is utilized in
the majority of jurisdictions. See supra Part II.C.
177.
See supra Part II.D.
178.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2000) (“[E]avesdropping of . . . conversation[s] . . . between any law enforcement officer, State’s Attorney . . . or a judge, while in the
performance of his or her official duties . . . is a Class 1 felony.”).
179.
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994). In this capacity, the vastnesses
of the exemptions section in the Act is truly remarkable, and exemplifies the Act’s poor
construction; the exemptions go on for pages. See generally 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3
(2011).
180.
See Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066, 1072 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (holding specifically that
strict scrutiny is triggered when there is either a viewpoint or content-based regulation on
audio recording public officials).
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broad way of accomplishing that goal would be to only ban audio recordings of individuals, including officers, when those persons had a reasonable
expectation of privacy “under circumstances justifying that expectation.”181
Second, there is no “compelling state interest” in regulating the audio
recordings of on-duty public police conversations that are spoken at audible
volumes and are gathered in an otherwise lawful manner. The only valid
interest that the State may assert is that of privacy for the officers. Be that
as it may, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court noted that “[p]rivacy
of communication is an important interest . . . .”182 “Important” is not
“compelling,” and under the scrutiny of the most rigorous of constitutional
tests, is not sufficient to trump the First Amendment right to gather, record,
and publish “matter[s] which [are] of public or general interest.”183
ii.

Intermediate Scrutiny as a Second Option

As highlighted previously, the Act is not a law that simply incidentally
burdens speech184 that is intended for general application to all because it
creates viewpoint and speaker discrimination, and categorically bans the
very type of speech the people seek to exercise.185 If for some reason, however, the application of strict scrutiny is denied under a constitutional challenge,186 then at the very least intermediate scrutiny would be the appropriate standard of review by reason of the fact that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”187
If intermediate scrutiny is indeed deemed appropriate, then in order for
the Act to withstand a constitutional challenge, it must be “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech . . . narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and . . . leave open ample alterna181.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2008) (using the very same language the
Illinois Legislature utilized to repudiate the significance of distinguishing between private
and non-private conversations).
182.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001) (emphasis added).
183.
See id. at 534 (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890)).
184.
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (paraphrasing central
language of the O’Brien test).
185.
Thus, the “type of speech” at issue is not simply speech that is incidentally
burdened by regulated conduct, it is speech expressed of content, which is gathered, received, and recorded by citizens, from citizen-officer encounters. See supra Part III.A.3.
186.
This would probably only happen if a reviewing court chose to not recognize
recording open on-duty police conversations as expressive activity, which as discussed previously, would contradict numerous precedent setting cases which hold otherwise. See supra
Part III.A.2-3.
187.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
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tive channels for communication of the information.”188 As discussed under
the strict scrutiny analysis, the Act is content-based,189 not narrowly tailored,190 and would probably only withstand a rational basis standard of
review in light of the fact that privacy interests of government officials is
only considered an “important” governmental interest,191 which is not “substantial,” and certainly not “compelling.” If under a constitutional challenge
of the Act, the state is somehow able to bypass the first two elements of the
test by convincing a court that the Act is not content-based and that it is
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,”192 the Act
would undoubtedly falter on the “alternative channels” element of the test.
Simply put, there are no adequate alternative mediums for gathering
information to circumvent the significance of audio recordings when individuals seek to document open conversations police officers have with citizens. It is true that the Act does not prohibit photographing, muted video
recording, or note taking of on-duty police officers.193 Nevertheless, audio
recordings present unique, yet essential evidentiary opportunities, which are
purely unattainable through these alternative mediums because they do not
capture unadulterated oral threats, insults, or other general verbal abuses.194
Moreover, the Act, as applied, flatly bans a type of speech195 and “prohibitions foreclosing entire media” may pose a danger to freedom of speech
because “by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can
suppress too much speech.”196 Consequently, such extensive flat-banning
regulations on mediums of expression have generally been invalidated197 —
as should be the Illinois Eavesdropping Act.

188.
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The Court
also asserted that “[e]xpression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject
to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.” Id.
189.
See supra Part III.A.4.i.
190.
See supra Part III.A.4.i.
191.
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001) (“Privacy of communication
is an important interest.”) (emphasis added).
192.
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
193.
See generally 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14 (2008); see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/14-4(b) (2000).
194.
See supra note 159.
195.
See supra note 185.
196.
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (emphasis added).
197.
See id. (striking down a ban on yard signs); see also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413, 416 (1943) (invalidating a prohibition on handing out leaflets in public ways); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-49 (1943) (striking down a ban on the distribution of
literature door to door); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938) (holding a
municipality ban on the distribution of leaflets as unconstitutional on its face).
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ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS

Besides implicating the First Amendment, this issue resonates in areas
such as personal privacy in public forums and general public policy as well.
1.

Privacy Interests in the Public Way

To be clear, what the people seek to accomplish is to overturn the
moratorium on monitoring on-duty, public police activity via audio recording. The people do not wish for a declaration to be made that police officers
should be subject to constant surreptitious civilian surveillance. After all,
police officers and other public officials are citizens as well and are entitled
a reasonable expectation of privacy under circumstances justifying that
expectation. However, when faced with an issue such as the one in this
situation; it is critical for the courts to objectively analyze what “reasonable,” under the circumstances, truly entails.198
For instance, in United States v. Speights, the First Circuit held that a
police officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own personal
space, especially when the department “acquiesced in [defendant’s] attempt
to secure his privacy.”199 As discussed previously, in much the same fashion, but on the other end of the spectrum, prior to the Illinois Legislature’s
abolishment of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” factor from the
eavesdropping analyses in 1994,200 the Illinois Supreme Court held in
Beardsley that an officer’s expectation of privacy is unreasonable when he
is openly speaking to a partner in a squad car while a detainee occupies the
backseat.201
Consequently, the question that must be answered is whether or not officers can claim subjective, “‘justifiable,’ . . . ‘reasonable,’ or . . . ‘legitimate expectation[s] of privacy . . . ’”202 when “(a) the officers are performing their public duties, (b) the officers are in public places, (c) the officers
198.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983) (asserting that Fourth
Amendment protections are only triggered when the aggrieved party “can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’” which is established by the
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy and also more importantly, by asking whether
or not “the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable . . .’’”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53, 361
(1967)).
199.
United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362, 363 (3d Cir. 1977) (dealing with an
officer’s expectation of privacy in his department locker).
200.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(d) (2008) (adding this definition of “conversation;” which took “reasonable expectation of privacy” out of the equation in determining if
an eavesdropping violation had in fact taken place).
201.
See People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ill. 1986).
202.
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-81.

414

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

are speaking at a volume audible to the unassisted human ear, and (d) the
manner of recording is otherwise lawful.”203 Unfortunately for police officers and for the Illinois Legislature’s Eavesdropping Act, officers do not
have reasonable, legitimate, or justifiable expectations of privacy when they
are in public ways, on-duty, and speaking at volumes easily overheard by
the unaided human ear since, as the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Knotts, “person[s] . . . on public thoroughfares ha[ve] no reasonable expectation of privacy, . . .”204 and thus, cannot seek sanctuary under a Fourth
Amendment privacy claim.
Furthermore, courts that have dealt specifically with the issue of
whether or not any individual, including police officers, has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a public way have habitually held that there is no
such expectation, and recording of conversations in those circumstances
does not violate eavesdropping laws.205 Yet, at a more rudimentary level,
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.”206
Thus, the exposure of the person, in a public way, speaking at volumes
easily overheard by passerbyers is not granted Fourth Amendment privacy
protections because there simply is no “reasonable expectation of privacy”
in such a situation.207 Moreover, “enforcement of [a privacy] provision . . .
[which] implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it
imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information . . . give[s] way
when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”208 When balanced against the public interest of exposing police mis-

203.
ACLU Complaint, supra note 11, at 1.
204.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
205.
See State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that,
under the same basic facts, an arrestee could legally tape record an officer because in that
situation, the officer had no reasonable expectation of privacy); accord Commonwealth v.
Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 906 (Pa. 1989) (holding that a prison guard, under similar circumstances, “would not have been justified in expecting that his conversation would not be
subject to interception.”); Gibson v. State of Md., 771 A.2d 536, 544 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2001) (holding that there is no “expectation of privacy” while traveling on a public right of
way); see also, e.g., Dep’t. of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Edwards, 654 So. 2d 628, 632
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that “[f]or an oral conversation to be protected . . . the
speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.”) (quoting State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla.
1994)); State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, *13-14 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 27, 2010) (holding that an officer has no reasonable expectation of privacy during a
traffic stop on the side of a public street).
206.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
207.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1983); see also People v.
Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 352 (Ill. 1986).
208.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001).

2012]

WATCHING THE WATCHMEN

415

conduct, which includes verbal threats and assaults,209 the privacy interests
of officers in public ways granted under the Act must give deference to the
people because after all, “[g]overnments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”210
2.

Public Policy Considerations

Beyond the basic constitutional arguments, which illustrate a necessity
for reform, there are also compelling public policy arguments that suggest
that modifying the Act is not only necessary, but would serve the best interest of society in general as well. In particular, such reform would allow
citizens to protect their own interests against questionable police conduct.
Police misconduct has been an ongoing problem for decades211 and to circumvent one of the only means of protection against such abuses by statutorily criminalizing electronic audio documentation of police interactions
with citizens for the sake of protecting on-duty police officers privacy interests212 is exceedingly unjust. When one considers, as touched upon previously, the fact that a conviction under the Act against a public official is
equivalent to a criminal sexual assault conviction,213 the “unjust” level of
the Act hurdles from “exceedingly,” to “outlandishly.” One of our fundamental American creeds is “all men are created equal”;214 as it stands right
now, however, citizens are deterred from challenging the law given the
serious penalties at stake for violating the Act against public officials.215 Is
this how a true “free society” should operate? Evidently, some, namely
public officials, are more equal than others.
Holding police officers and other public officials to a higher standard
of accountability is a practice that is central to the furtherance of the democratic process.216 In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, the Supreme Court
209.
See supra note 159.
210.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).
211.
See Hickman, supra note 2; see also Futterman, supra note 2; Lisa A. Skehill,
Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute
Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981,
985 nn.39-40 (2009) (pointing to a series of cases and articles, which illustrate the ever
prevalent and rising problem of police abuses on citizens throughout the country).
212.
See generally 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14 (2008).
213.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(b)(1) (2010).
214.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).
215.
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2000).
216.
See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966). The Court stated:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is op-
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noted how, as a practical matter, with regards to “fighting words,”217 when
“such words are addressed to a police officer[, officers are] trained to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen.”218 Likewise, in
Gooding v. Wilson, in a similar situation where police officers were insulted
subsequently causing a fight to ensue, the Court held that the Georgia statute which made it a misdemeanor to use “opprobrious words or abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace”219 was on its face unconstitutional.220 The Court reasoned that the statute was overbroad and did not
adequately establish the “standard of responsibility” expected from individuals, such as officers, from being provoked into fighting situations.221
Accordingly, police officers and other public officials of the State of
Illinois should also be held to an elevated standard of accountability, and
for good cause given the pervasiveness of general misconduct across the
nation.222 Not only is there misconduct in the field, but as one scholar
noted, “[w]hether it is conjecture by individual observers, a survey of
criminal attorneys, or a more sophisticated study, the existing literature
demonstrates a widespread belief that ‘testilying’ is a frequent occurrence.”223 “Testilying” refers to public officials, more specifically police
officers, lying under oath in order to convict defendants.224
Although it is often argued that officers will be “chilled” from performing their official duties in an effective and efficient manner if they are
subjected to constant civilian surveillance via audio documentation when
they are in public ways,225 the fact of the matter remains, officers are al-

Id.

erated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political
processes.

217.
“[F]ighting words” are words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942).
218.
Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972).
219.
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518 (1972) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572 (1972)).
220.
Id. at 528.
221.
Id.
222.
See, e.g., supra note 211 and accompanying text.
223.
Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1996).
224.
See id. at 1040.
225.
See Plaintiff’s Combined Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and Response in Opposition to Defendant’s. Motion to Dismiss at 12, ACLU v. Alvarez, No.
10-CV-05235 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/ACLU-v-Alvarez-PI-reply-MTD-response-10-6-10.pdf. (referring
to Defendant Alvarez’s claim that the ACLU program would “chill and undermine the efforts of the police.”).
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ready under continuous observation from their very own equipment.226 It is
guilelessly myopic to aver that civilians exercising their constitutionally
protected First Amendment rights induce inefficient and ineffective police
efforts, especially given the fact that officers are fully aware that their actions are being monitored via in-house video/audio surveillance equipment
during most, if not all citizen-officer encounters.227 Audio documentation
helps clarify police interactions with citizens by painting a complete picture
of each encounter, can help prove or disprove accusations of misconduct,
and, in effect, may help reduce the likelihood of “testilying.”228 There simply is no justifiable reason in law or otherwise suggesting that granting the
right to audio record public citizen-officer verbal exchanges exclusively to
officers and officers alone is good policy.229 Not to mention, we, as taxpaying citizens, pay their salaries.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois Eavesdropping Act’s flat ban on audio recording of police
officers and other public officials is in direct violation of the First Amendment; the Amendment that fundamentally serves as the catalyst from which
all of the other personal liberties of the Bill of Rights are derived.230 In its
current capacity, the Act engenders open viewpoint speaker discrimination
through its police exemptions, fails to properly balance the privacy rights of
officers against the people’s superior First Amendment interests, and lastly,
disregards the necessity for public awareness of police transgressions.
Without reforming the law through legislative action or through judicial
226.
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(h) (2010) (demonstrating by example the
statutory language in the police exemptions referencing law enforcement recording equipment).
227.
In forty-eight other jurisdictions, where it is legal to record officers and other
public officials when there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, officers are able to perform their official duties without being subjected to this so called “chilling effect.” See supra
Part II.C.
228.
See Slobogin, supra note 223, at 1051-54.
229.
See Futterman, supra note 2, at 266. Futterman points to how out of 10,149 total
misconduct complaints filed against the Chicago Police Department between 2002 and 2004,
there were only nineteen sustained meaningful disciplinary actions taken against the accused
officers, which resulted in suspensions of one week or longer. Id. Futterman argues that
there would have been more complaints, but due to a lack of faith in the justice system’s
ability to discipline the culprits and fears of future reprisal from officers, citizens have been
reluctant to come forward. Id. Citizen free use of cameras with respect to citizen-officer
encounters would certainly go a long way to alleviate such fears in order to bring police
misconduct to justice. See Slobogin, supra note 223, at 1051-54.
230.
See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (holding that freedom of
thought, speech, and press “is the ‘matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other
form of freedom’”) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)).
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precedent, poor public policy and unconstitutional impediments on Illinois
citizens’ constitutionally protected rights will remain unchecked and the
people will continue to be irreparably harmed.231
As President John F. Kennedy once said:
We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment . . . far outweighed the dangers
which are cited to justify it . . . . [T]here is little value in insuring the survival of our nation if our traditions do not
survive with it . . . . And no official . . . whether his rank is
high or low, civilian or military, should interpret my words
. . . as an excuse to censor the news, to stifle dissent, to
cover up . . . mistakes or to withhold from the press and the
public the facts they deserve to know.232
President Kennedy clearly knew the fundamental significance of fostering
government transparency in a free and open society. He etched into our
brains that time-honored Presidential challenge, “ask not what your country
can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.”233 It is time to fulfill our democratic obligations as citizens and rise up to our thirty-fifth
President’s noble challenge. Watching the watchmen is not the responsibility of other watchmen; if we want to ensure the survival of our nation,
watching the watchmen is the collective responsibility of we the people,
and we the people alone.
ROBERT J. TOMEI JR.∗

231.
See Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969) (“[T]he
presumption of irreparable harm is manifest . . . where it is alleged that first amendment
rights have been chilled as a result of both government action and inaction.”).
232.
President John F. Kennedy, Address before the American Newspaper Publishers
Association (Apr. 27, 1961), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/ReadyReference/JFK-Speeches/The-President-and-the-Press-Address-before-the-AmericanNewspaper-Publishers-Association.aspx.
233.
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